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This report is a team effort. That said, I alone am responsible for any mistakes and misjudgements. We 
are largely in agreement, but not completely so. In particular, the recommendations for realigning our 
assistance in Afghanistan more closely with Canadian Forces’ activities are very much a preoccupation of 
mine, a preoccupation not shared by all. We also differ regarding the feasibility of negotiating, using a 
back channel, with the Taliban. 
 
The first section contains our recommendations to high level policy and decision makers (we hope they 
will read at least this much). The main body of the report contains our analysis of what is happening, and 
why. It does not repeat all the recommendations. The conclusion covers a number of other issues that 
have come to our attention, particularly with respect to development assistance, which we believe have 
the potential to be as important to Afghanistan as Canada’s military presence is. They are not all repeated 
in the first section. 
 
Our team of researchers and writers included Marc André Boivin, Lenard Cohen, Graham Fuller, Lauryn 
Oates, and a fifth person who prefers to remain anonymous. They are all remarkable people. I thank 
them. I also thank the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), without whose financial 
support and encouragement there would be no report. The CDFAI does not necessarily endorse the 
report’s recommendations. 
 
It is easy to criticize what is happening in Afghanistan. It is a far more difficult task to recommend what 
should be done. In my long professional life I have not encountered a more difficult policy challenge. I am 
not sure we have all the right solutions. But I do know we in Canada urgently need a more informed 
debate on these issues. Much is at stake. 
 
 
Gordon S. Smith 
Centre for Global Studies 
University of Victoria 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• Canadian military and civilian personnel have put, and are putting, their lives in mortal 
danger in Afghanistan; we respect and are proud of them.  
• The Afghanistan-Pakistan region arguably represents the single most important, indeed 
critical, region in the world in the global effort against terrorism. 
• NATO’s aim is “to help establish the conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy – after 
decades of conflict, destruction, and poverty – a representative government and self-
sustaining peace and security”; this is a worthy, yet very ambitious goal. 
• Current NATO policies and programs in Afghanistan are not on course to achieve that 
objective, even within a period of ten years. Some policies are working; more are not. 
• The next two years will likely be decisive. If major conflict continues at the present rate, 
there is a very real risk that the local population will become increasingly frustrated by the 
lack of security (engendering various negative responses), and that some allies will head 
home.  
 
The current odds against NATO’s success in Afghanistan are daunting, but the situation is not hopeless. 
The cause is worth a renewed and serious, concerted effort. Time is not on NATO’s side, however, and 
prompt, effective action must be taken. 
 
• In the event of NATO’s failure to achieve its broad nation-building goals in Afghanistan, 
its bottom line must revert to the original source of Western concern: the presence of al-
Qa’ida in the area. That said, al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan today is less the centre of global 
terrorism than it was in 2001, simply because the movement has metastasized since then 
to other regions of the world. The leadership of al-Qa’ida today is in Pakistan, and it is 
remobilizing. 
• The most essential goal – the bottom line – is to isolate al-Qa’ida from the mainstream 
Taliban and to find incentives to dissuade the Taliban from a commitment to international 
jihadi violence. This is not easily accomplished, given the close relationship between the 
two at the top levels, but it could possibly be achieved at the local level over time.  
• We do not believe that the Taliban can be defeated or eliminated as a political entity in 
any meaningful time frame by Western armies using military measures, and certainly not 
with the relatively small increases in force strength that are currently planned. Indeed, 
some argue that certain activities of Western armies on the ground in Afghanistan are 
counterproductive to winning the support of the Pashtuns against the Taliban. 
• Afghanistan should therefore receive – not in NATO communiqué language, but in 
actions – a larger, more fully operational military presence, above all in the south and the 
east, as the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) has requested, eliminating “national 
caveats” with a fairer sharing of the burden; and greatly increased and strategically 
targeted civilian aid on the ground (focussing on Kandahar, as well as substantially and 
much more quickly strengthening the weak Afghan army and police). 
 
Laid out in point form, the remainder of this section discusses, first, the current circumstances 
surrounding the Taliban; secondly, Pashtun support of the Taliban; and finally, related issues confounding 
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Interspersed with our assessment of the situation are recommendations 
and suggestions meant to provide direction and rectify problems as we have assessed them. 
• The Taliban are zealous extremists who advocate a highly disputed interpretation of 
Islam that is at odds with the beliefs of most Afghans. They also use violence as a means 
to achieve political ends. Nevertheless, the Pashtuns who support the Taliban do so for a 
variety of complex reasons: a craving for stability and order, self-interest, disillusionment 
with warlords, dislike of outsiders, discouragement regarding the slow pace of 
development, a desire to see the Pashtuns paramount in their country rather than the 
non-Pashtun Northern Alliance, and religious zeal. Mullah Omar remains unchallenged 
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as leader of the Taliban, and there is no alternative representing Pashtun interests in 
Afghanistan today who has more clout than he. 
The exact role Pakistan, and Pakistani Pashtuns in particular, plays in support of the Taliban is 
controversial, but it is pivotal to the direction the insurgency in Afghanistan will take;  
• The border remains easily permeable. 
• Without Pakistani acquiescence and even support, the Taliban would have much more 
difficulty sustaining itself as a political entity in Afghanistan. 
• We believe the nature of Pakistan’s geopolitics in the broader region (think India) makes 
it all but impossible for Islamabad to abandon or destroy the Taliban; the latter is a 
significant political vehicle of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, one with a strong following 
inside Pakistan. 
• While Pashtun tribes are notoriously fractured, they have traditionally united against 
foreign invaders. While the Taliban are hardly universally accepted as a legitimate force, 
most Pashtuns know the Taliban will likely remain long after the foreigners have been 
drawn away to new battles in new lands, and are gone from Afghanistan. 
• While negotiations certainly cannot guarantee that the Taliban will be brought into the 
political process, failure to negotiate will almost surely cede the field to them. Stability in 
Afghanistan depends on a political resolution. 
• A variety of political approaches must be taken, including back channel negotiations with 
both the leadership of the Taliban and with local tribal leadership – those prepared to talk 
rather than fight to the bitter end. These negotiations would focus on drawing the Taliban 
into greater participation in government, both central and provincial. 
• One incentive to bringing the Taliban into a more co-operative mode would be to indicate 
(quietly) that, if there is no political resolution and civil war were to break out, NATO is 
prepared to back the Northern Alliance and support a major Indian role in Afghanistan 
indefinitely – Pakistan’s ultimate bête noire. 
• Realistically, we do not believe that President Musharraf will do much more to bring 
Islamists to heel in Pakistan. While he may be willing, under rising external pressure, to 
do more to complicate the actions of the Taliban, he will not be party to their destruction; 
he will hide behind assertions that rogue elements in the ISI (the intelligence branch of 
the Pakistani military) are the chief drivers. (We are not persuaded that the ISI is 
fundamentally a rogue organization, but rather represents a powerful and significant 
geopolitical and ideological position within the Pakistani political spectrum.) 
• That said, Canada should join with other NATO countries in pressing Musharraf to do as 
much as he can; as a political leader, he responds to both foreign and domestic pressure. 
• More plausibly, Musharraf might be prepared to see the ISI create a back channel link to 
the Taliban that could reduce the level of conflict in Afghanistan, but this approach would 
have to be presented as offering meaningful beneficial tradeoffs to Pakistan’s ultimate 
geopolitical position in Afghanistan. Even with the ISI playing a more constructive role, 
the struggle will basically be won or lost by political and military forces inside Afghanistan, 
despite Pakistan’s importance. 
• The ISI could conceivably be used as a go-between in these negotiations, but only as 
long as it was convinced that Pakistan’s essential geopolitical interests are realistically 
served – also a tall order. 
 
Ultimately, the alleviation of poverty must become a primary strategy for achieving security in 
Afghanistan. Yet the country still receives far less funding from the international donor community overall 
than most other post-conflict nations.  
 
• Reconstruction in Kandahar is woefully insufficient. For security reasons there are few 
civilians engaged in aid and development in the province, and NGOs are leaving because 
of the same concern for their safety.  
• We believe efforts to destroy poppy production are extremely counterproductive under 
the present circumstances. Instead, the focus should be to destroy the laboratories and 
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the traffickers rather than the poppy crops of the impoverished producer/farmers; an 
additional and controversial approach, though one which must be explored, would be to 
purchase poppy crops through an international marketing board. The cost could be 
partially met through resale of the product for medicinal purposes. This is an alternative 
which demands consideration in light of the global shortage of opiate-based morphine 
and other medicines. 
• The Canadian government should ensure that the bulk of development funds is spent 
where Canadian Forces and civilian groups can show the local population quick, 
beneficial results. This is not a classic development situation – it is an insurgency in 
which Canada now “wears” Kandahar – and different policies must apply. 
• Canadian diplomatic efforts should support the approach in this report in all forums – 
NATO, the UN, bilaterally, and in Afghanistan itself. The 3Ds (diplomacy, defence, and 
development) are not, however, effectively working together – the Canadian Forces have 
a fundamentally different agenda than does the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). We hope the decision to give a coordinating leadership in the public 
service to the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs works to integrate the 
government’s efforts. It will not be easy.  
• The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have shouldered most of the 
burden of the current intervention. If NATO, as its leadership has stated, shares our belief 
that this region ranks so highly, then why has commensurate funding and military support 
from other NATO member states not been forthcoming? 
o Is it because many in NATO fear it is a losing venture? 
o Is it because NATO states are simply paying lip service to an American-
dominated operation that they view as basically contaminated through 
association with the United States’ broader regional policies in the Muslim world? 
o Is it simply because the allies are not prepared to upset their domestic Moslem 
populations or risk sustaining casualties? 
o Or is it all of these factors? 
• A NATO failure in Afghanistan would generate a wide variety of potential future scenarios 
(set forth at some length in the concluding segment of this report to generate debate), 
each with very different implications requiring close examination before subsequent 




























Le présent rapport est le résultat d’un effort d’équipe. Ceci dit, je suis seul responsable de toute erreur, 
de jugement ou autre. Nous sommes d’accord dans l’ensemble, mais pas en tout point. En particulier, les 
recommandations portant sur un réalignement plus étroit de notre aide en Afghanistan avec les activités 
des Forces canadiennes sont un sujet qui me préoccupe particulièrement, mais qui n’est pas partagé par 
tous. De plus, nous ne sommes pas du même avis concernant la faisabilité des négociations avec les 
Talibans, en utilisant des voies officieuses. 
 
Dans la première partie, figurent nos recommandations aux décisionnaires et aux responsables des 
politiques de haut niveau (nous espérons qu’ils se rendront jusque-là dans leur lecture). Le gros du 
rapport comprend notre analyse de ce qui se passe et pourquoi. Il ne reprend pas toutes nos 
recommandations. La conclusion traite de plusieurs autres enjeux qui ont attiré notre attention, 
particulièrement l’aide au développement qui, à notre avis, est une activité potentiellement aussi 
importante que la présence militaire du Canada en Afghanistan. Ils ne sont pas tous réitérés dans la 
première partie. 
 
Notre équipe de chercheurs et de rédacteurs comprenait Marc-André Boivin, Lenard Cohen, Graham 
Fuller, Lauryn Oates et une cinquième personne qui préfère garder l’anonymat. Ce sont toutes des 
personnes remarquables et je les remercie. Je remercie également le Canadian Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Institute (CDFAI), dont l’aide financière et les encouragements ont permis la réalisation de ce 
rapport. Le CDFAI ne souscrit pas nécessairement aux recommandations du rapport. 
 
Il est aisé de critiquer la situation en Afghanistan. Il est bien plus difficile de formuler des 
recommandations sur ce qui devrait être fait en Afghanistan. Durant ma carrière, je n’ai jamais eu à 
affronter un plus grand défi de politique. Je ne suis pas sûr que nous possédions toutes les solutions. 




Gordon S. Smith 
Centre for Global Studies 

























SOMMAIRE ET RECOMMANDATIONS 
 
• Les effectifs militaires et civils canadiens ont mis, et mettent encore, leur vie en grand 
danger en Afghanistan; nous avons du respect et nous éprouvons de la fierté pour eux.  
• La région qui regroupe l’Afghanistan et le Pakistan représente sans doute la région la 
plus importante, et même critique, dans le monde pour ce qui est des efforts de lutte 
contre le terrorisme. 
• L’OTAN a pour mission « d’aider à établir les conditions qui permettront à l’Afghanistan 
de jouir — après des décennies de conflits, de destruction et de pauvreté — d’un 
gouvernement représentatif, et d’une paix et d’une sécurité autonomes »; il s’agit d’un 
objectif louable, quoique bien ambitieux. 
• Les politiques et programmes actuels de l’OTAN en Afghanistan ne pourront atteindre cet 
objectif, même dans les 10 prochaines années. Certaines politiques réussissent, mais il y 
en a bien davantage qui échouent. 
• Les deux prochaines années seront probablement décisives. Si un conflit majeur se 
poursuit au même rythme que maintenant, il y a un risque très réel de créer une 
frustration croissante chez la population locale en raison du manque de sécurité (créant 
diverses réactions négatives), et d’entraîner le départ de certains alliés.  
 
Les chances de réussite de l’intervention de l’OTAN en Afghanistan sont bien minces à l’heure actuelle, 
mais la situation n’est pas désespérée. La cause mérite un sérieux effort renouvelé et concerté. 
Malheureusement, le temps joue contre l’OTAN et il est donc essentiel d’agir rapidement et efficacement. 
 
• Si l’OTAN devait échouer dans sa mission de réaliser des objectifs généraux de 
reconstruction en Afghanistan, il devra en dernier recours en revenir à la source première 
des inquiétudes occidentales : la présence d’al-Qaïda dans la région. Ceci dit, al-Qaïda 
en Afghanistan est de nos jours moins au centre du terrorisme mondial qu’il ne l’était en 
2001, tout simplement parce que ce mouvement s’est disséminé depuis dans d’autres 
régions du monde. Le leadership d’al-Qaïda est maintenant au Pakistan et il se 
remobilise. 
• L’objectif le plus important — le fond du problème — est d’isoler al-Qaïda des principaux 
Talibans, et de trouver des moyens de dissuader les Talibans de s’engager à la violence 
internationale du Jihad. Ce n’est pas tâche facile, vu la relation étroite qui unit les deux 
groupes à haut niveau, mais elle pourrait éventuellement être réalisée au niveau local 
avec le temps.  
• Nous sommes d’avis que les Talibans ne pourront être vaincus ou éliminés comme entité 
politique dans un délai significatif par les armées occidentales au moyen de mesures 
militaires, et certainement pas vu l’augmentation relativement faible des effectifs qui est 
planifiée actuellement. En fait, de l’avis de certains, il y a des activités menées sur le 
terrain par les armées occidentales en Afghanistan qui vont à l’encontre du but 
recherché, qui est d’obtenir l’appui des Pashtoons contre les Talibans. 
• L’Afghanistan devrait donc bénéficier, non sous forme de paroles de l’OTAN, mais en 
gestes, d’une présence militaire plus opérationnelle, en priorité dans le Sud et l’Est du 
pays; comme l’a réclamé le Commandant suprême des Forces alliées (SACEUR), il faut 
éliminer les oppositions nationales en partageant le fardeau plus équitablement et fournir 
une aide accrue à la population civile qui est ciblée stratégiquement sur le terrain (en se 
concentrant sur Kandahar, tout en renforçant considérablement et bien plus rapidement 
l’armée et la police afghanes bien trop faibles). 
 
Le reste de cette partie est rédigée en style télégraphique et traite en premier lieu des circonstances 
actuelles des Talibans, en second lieu, de l’appui des Talibans par les Pashtoons, et finalement, des 
enjeux connexes qui mettent en péril la mission de l’OTAN en Afghanistan. Dans notre évaluation de la 
situation, nous avons énoncé, ici et là, des recommandations et des suggestions visant à offrir une 
orientation et à rectifier les problèmes que nous avons soulevés. 
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• Les Talibans sont des extrémistes zélés qui défendent une interprétation hautement 
contestée de l’Islam, contraire aux croyances de la plupart des Afghans. Ils ont recours à 
la violence pour parvenir à leurs fins politiques. Cependant, les Pashtoons qui appuient 
les Talibans le font pour une diversité de raisons complexes : une soif d’ordre et de 
stabilité, un intérêt personnel, une désillusion envers les chefs militaires, une aversion 
pour les étrangers, le découragement face au rythme trop lent du développement, un 
désir de voir les Pashtoons dominer au pays plutôt que l’alliance du Nord non-Pashtoon, 
et la ferveur religieuse. Le mollah Omar est le chef incontesté des Talibans, et il n’existe 
personne représentant les intérêts pashtoons en Afghanistan à l’heure actuelle qui 
jouisse d’un prestige plus grand. 
Le rôle exact que jouent le Pakistan et les Pashtoons du Pakistan en particulier, en faveur des Talibans, 
est controversé, mais il est essentiel à la direction que prendra l’insurrection en Afghanistan; 
• La frontière est facilement pénétrable. 
• Sans l’assentiment ou même sans l’appui du Pakistan, les Talibans auraient bien plus de 
difficultés à se maintenir en tant qu’entité politique en Afghanistan. 
• Nous estimons que la géopolitique du Pakistan dans la région élargie (pensons à l’Inde) 
rendra presque impossible pour Islamabad d’abandonner ou de détruire les Talibans; ces 
derniers sont un important véhicule politique des Pashtoons en Afghanistan, et ils ont 
beaucoup de partisans au Pakistan.  
• Bien que les tribus pashtoons soient connues pour leur manque d’unité, elles se sont 
traditionnellement regroupées face aux envahisseurs étrangers. Bien que les Talibans ne 
soient certainement pas universellement acceptés comme une force légitime, la plupart 
des Pashtoons savent que les Talibans seront probablement encore là, bien après que 
les étrangers soient repartis vers de nouvelles batailles dans d’autres contrées, ayant 
quitté l’Afghanistan. 
• Bien qu’il n’y ait pas de garantie que les négociations mènent à une participation des 
Talibans au processus politique, la non-négociation laissera presque certainement le 
champ ouvert aux Talibans. La stabilité en Afghanistan dépend d’une résolution politique. 
• Il faut entreprendre un éventail de démarches politiques, dont des négociations 
officieuses avec les chefs Talibans et les chefs des tribus locales, avec ceux qui sont 
prêts à négocier plutôt qu’à se battre à tout prix. Ces négociations viseraient à faire 
participer davantage les Talibans au gouvernement, tant central que provincial. 
• Une mesure qui inciterait les Talibans à être plus coopératifs serait d’indiquer 
(discrètement) qu’en l’absence d’une résolution politique et en cas d’éclatement d’une 
guerre civile, l’OTAN serait prêt à épauler l’Alliance du Nord et à appuyer indéfiniment un 
rôle important de l’Inde en Afghanistan – la bête noire suprême du Pakistan. 
• Soyons réalistes, nous ne pensons pas que le président Musharraf en fera beaucoup 
plus pour faire rentrer les Islamistes dans les rangs au Pakistan. Bien qu’il puisse être 
disposé, sous les pressions externes croissantes, à en faire davantage pour compliquer 
les actes des Talibans, il ne se fera pas complice de leur destruction; il se dissimulera 
derrière les affirmations que ce sont les francs-tireurs de l’ISI (les services de 
renseignements de l’armée pakistanaise) qui sont les principaux catalyseurs. (Nous ne 
sommes pas convaincus que l’ISI soit fondamentalement un organisme sans scrupule, 
mais plutôt qu’il représente une position géopolitique et idéologique puissante et 
importante dans l’éventail politique pakistanais.) 
• Ceci dit, le Canada devrait se joindre à d’autres pays de l’OTAN et presser Musharraf 
d’en faire autant que possible; en tant que chef politique, il réagit aux pressions, qu’elles 
soient étrangères ou nationales. 
• De façon plausible, Musharraf serait peut-être prêt à voir l’ISI créer un lien d’intermédiaire 
secret avec les Talibans, ce qui pourrait réduire la gravité du conflit en Afghanistan; mais 
il faudra faire valoir cette démarche comme un compromis qui offrirait des avantages 
positifs et significatifs à la position géopolitique éventuelle du Pakistan en Afghanistan. 
Même si l’ISI devait jouer un rôle plus constructif, la lutte sera éventuellement gagnée ou 
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perdue par les forces politiques et militaires en Afghanistan, et ce en dépit de 
l’importance du Pakistan. 
• L’ISI pourrait en théorie servir d’intermédiaire dans ces négociations, mais seulement s’il 
est convaincu qu’elles serviront de manière réaliste les principaux intérêts géopolitiques 
du Pakistan, ce qui est également beaucoup demander. 
 
Au bout du compte, c’est la réduction de la pauvreté qui doit être la principale stratégie favorisant la 
sécurité en Afghanistan. Malheureusement, le pays reçoit encore bien moins de financement du milieu 
international des donateurs que n’en reçoivent la plupart des autres nations après un conflit.  
 
• La reconstruction à Kandahar est largement insuffisante. Pour des raisons de sécurité, 
peu de civils participent à l’aide et au développement de la province et les ONG quittent 
les lieux parce qu’ils s’inquiètent aussi de leur manque de sécurité.  
• Nous sommes d’avis que les efforts visant la destruction de la culture du pavot sont 
extrêmement contre-productifs dans les circonstances actuelles. Il faudrait se concentrer 
sur la destruction des laboratoires et des trafiquants, plutôt sur les récoltes de pavot des 
producteurs-agriculteurs démunis; une approche supplémentaire et controversée, mais 
qui mérite d’être étudiée, serait de faire l’achat des récoltes de pavot par le biais d’un 
office de commercialisation international. Les coûts d’une telle mesure pourraient être 
amortis en partie par la revente du produit à des fins médicinales. Ce serait une solution 
qui mérite d’être envisagée, à la lumière de la pénurie mondiale de morphine et autres 
médicaments à base d’opiacés. 
• Le gouvernement canadien devrait veiller à ce que la plus grande partie des fonds de 
développement soient dépensés là où les Forces canadiennes et les groupes civils 
peuvent montrer à la population locale des résultats rapides et avantageux. Il ne s’agit 
pas d’une situation classique de développement; il s’agit d’une insurrection dans le cadre 
de laquelle le Canada « porte » maintenant Kandahar, et il faut donc employer des 
politiques différentes. 
• Les efforts diplomatiques canadiens devraient appuyer l’approche décrite dans le présent 
rapport, et ce au sein de tous les forums : l’OTAN, l’ONU, bilatéralement et en 
Afghanistan même. Cependant, les trois « D » (diplomatie, défense et développement) 
ne collaborent pas efficacement, car les Forces canadiennes ont un programme 
fondamentalement différent de celui de l’Agence canadienne de développement 
international (ACDI). Nous espérons que la décision de confier un leadership de 
coordination au sein de la fonction publique au sous-ministre adjoint des Affaires 
étrangères permettra d’intégrer les efforts du gouvernement. La tâche ne sera 
certainement pas aisée.  
• Les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et le Canada ont assumé la plus grande partie du 
fardeau de l’intervention en cours. Si l’OTAN partage avec nous la conviction que cette 
région est d’une grande importance, comme l’a déclaré son commandement, pourquoi 
donc un financement et un appui militaire proportionnés n’ont-ils pas été fournis par les 
autres États membres de l’OTAN ?  
o Est-ce parce que bon nombre de membres de l’OTAN craignent que ce ne soit 
une bataille perdue d’avance ? 
o Est-ce parce que les États membres de l’OTAN n’offrent qu’un service pour la 
forme à des opérations dominées par les Américains, opérations qui, selon eux, 
sont fondamentalement empoisonnées par leur association aux politiques 
générales des États-Unis dans le monde musulman ? 
o Est-ce simplement parce que les alliés ne sont pas prêts à contrarier leurs 
propres ressortissants musulmans ou à risquer des pertes humaines ? 
o Ou s’agit-il de toutes ces raisons réunies ? 
• Un échec de l’OTAN en Afghanistan produirait tout un éventail de scénarios éventuels 
(décrits dans la conclusion du présent rapport pour encourager le débat), comportant 
chacun des répercussions très variables qui méritent un examen de près avant la 
formulation de nouvelles politiques.  
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I   CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW WE GOT THERE 
 
Canada’s original decision to go to Afghanistan stems directly from the events of 9/11. Many new factors 
complicated that original decision as Canada’s policies subsequently evolved.  
 
The global shock of 9/11 created broad international concern at the time that no country could remain 
immune to similar attacks from terrorist groups in the future; a consensus rapidly emerged that joint 
international action was required to eliminate such groups and their sanctuaries wherever they were 
located. President George W. Bush unambiguously demanded that all countries align themselves as 
“either with the U.S. or against it” in the struggle. Canada initially responded to the challenge by 
mobilizing air and naval forces and then secretly sent Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) troops to Afghanistan 
in late 2001. A larger contingent of 750 Canadian soldiers was then sent to Kandahar in February 2002 
for a period of six months. Afghanistan became a symbolically key state in the broader effort to deter 
radical Islamic jihadism, particularly given its past role as host to al-Qa’ida under the Taliban.  
 
But the Afghan challenge also came in the broader context of a U.S.-Canadian crisis regarding 
Washington’s invasion of Iraq; Canada opposed this move and declined to send troops. However, 
sending a second deployment of 2000 Canadian soldiers to Kabul in 2003 in the multilateral setting of 
NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allowed Ottawa to avoid Washington’s 
opprobrium for staying out of Iraq by making this significant contribution to the “U.S. global war on terror.” 
Beyond its bilateral relations with Washington, Canada has sought to maintain a significant role within 
NATO which, together with various UN resolutions, provides a legitimizing multilateral umbrella for 
Canadian military participation in Afghanistan. 
 
THE CANADIAN ROLE SINCE 2001 
Since 2001, Canada has applied the “3Ds” to expand its presence in Afghanistan. The United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1386 at the end of 2001 mandated the ISAF to assist the Afghan 
Transitional Authority by providing security in Kabul; this has been reaffirmed and extended to the whole 
country in several subsequent UNSC resolutions. After Canada successfully lobbied for a NATO takeover 
of ISAF in 2003, it sent troops to secure parts of Kabul in a stabilization role. The Canadian Forces (CF) 
also provided security to the perimeter of the site of the Constitutional Loya Jirga proceedings, a key 
political process mandated by the Bonn Agreement.  
 
Prior to 2001, Canada provided about $10 million annually to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid. At the 
2002 Tokyo Donors conference, Canada declared new commitments to Kabul, transforming Afghanistan 
into Canada’s single largest aid recipient. Canadian development assistance for Afghanistan is scheduled 
to continue until at least 2011 with a current allocation of $100 million annually.  
 
Canada took responsibility for Kandahar province after other NATO member countries volunteered to 
deploy to more secure provinces in 2004. In 2005, Canadian Forces moved to Kandahar, taking over an 
American Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), one of 24 PRTs now active in the country. The current 
Canadian mission consists of 2,500 troops in Kandahar; 30 CF personnel in Kabul, either working on 
specific security areas as liaison or embedded within a joint task force; and a 15 member strategic 
advisory team of military planners assisting the Afghan government. The deployment has been renewed 
until February 2009.  
 
Canada has supported other stabilization and peacebuilding initiatives, notably in the area of 
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR). Canada supported the 
decommissioning of militia forces, the collection and storage of 12,000 weapons, the destruction of 
ammunition stockpiles, de-mining, and landmine education. 
 
Canadian involvement in Afghanistan first hit Canadian television screens in a major way when the CF 
moved to Kandahar to take on an active combat role in the more volatile and unstable south; they rapidly 
became the object of regular Taliban attacks, and CF began to sustain the heaviest casualties of any 
NATO participant in per capita terms.  
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II   THE HISTORICAL LEGACY:  UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN THROUGH A GEOPOLITICAL 
LENS 
 
As Canada takes on increasingly intense and deadly engagements in Afghanistan, its policies must be 
grounded in a realistic understanding of the inherent problems and challenges. A long series of conflicts 
over the last thirty years, a centuries-old rejection of all forms of foreign intervention, a historically 
fragmented state, and a complex and diverse political culture – all present unusually daunting challenges 
to any peacebuilding mission.  
 
UNDERSTANDING THE AFGHAN STATE 
The Afghan state has been historically fragmented by a number of factors: its mix of at least seven major 
ethnic groups and the ongoing power struggle among them, the heavily tribal nature of the Pashtun south, 
the country’s notoriously difficult physical terrain, its nomadic groups, and ethnicities that in most cases 
spill over the border into neighbouring countries (most notably with Pakistan, in the transnational Pashtun 
region). There is also a long history of local resistance to a centralized state in Afghanistan. Institutions of 
local governance operate beyond centralized state control. A weak central government has helped to 
preserve all these characteristics.  
 
Violent conflicts in recent history have exacerbated already entrenched difficult relations between the 
centre and the periphery, strengthening rogue groups like the private militias of warlords who control 
resources and offer protection where it is scarce. Since 2001, the Afghan government has used various 
strategies to contend with these para-state players, including efforts to integrate them into government 
institutions (with varying degrees of success), to disarm and demobilize some militias, and recently in the 
south, to re-arm new private militias to act as paramilitary or anti-terrorist forces in insecure areas.  
 
A HISTORICALLY THREATENED SOVEREIGNTY  
Lying athwart the crossroads of Asia, Afghanistan has been in the invasion path of various armies for 
thousands of years, including various Persian empires, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan’s army, the 
Indian Moghul Empire, the British on three occasions throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
and the Soviet Union in 1979. NATO forces represent only the latest of the foreign troops occupying 
Afghan soil. 
 
The current cycle of violence can be traced back to the pro-Soviet Communist military coup in 1978 that 
plunged the country into what has become nearly thirty years of ongoing war. The coup prompted a 
Soviet invasion to protect the new Afghan Communist regime, and a ten-year popular resistance against 
110,000 Soviet occupational troops fighting alongside 100,000 Afghan government troops against diverse 
mujahideen factions supported by the United States and many Middle Eastern countries. The Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989 then resulted in an Afghan civil war among rival mujahideen and warlords creating 
conditions of virtual anarchy; hundreds of thousands died throughout the country. Only when the Taliban 
gained power in 1996 was domestic order, of a kind, re-established.  
 
THE MUJAHIDEEN AND CHALLENGES TO THE RULE OF LAW 
In the course of their struggle against Soviet occupation, many groups that were part of the mujahideen 
were accused of committing “crimes against humanity” against their fellow Afghans, including massacres, 
rape, and the pillage of villages (either ethnically-based reprisals or acts of revenge against those civilians 
who co-operated with the Soviet-supported regime). The chaos and lawlessness of the civil war among 
the mujahideen ultimately facilitated the rise of the Taliban who, with Pakistani support, were able to 
restore order to most of the country, thereby meeting with much early public acceptance. It was the forces 
of al-Qa’ida, evolving out of select mujahideen groups, who took advantage of the Taliban to entrench 
their position in Afghanistan in a new form of violent, anti-Western resistance; al-Qai’da then aided the 
Taliban in securing the latter’s hold on the country which in turn provided a secure base for al-Qa’ida. 
That then led to the American invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, thus launching a new phase of internal 
warfare.  
 
The consequences of prolonged conflict have destroyed any semblance of central control and opened the 
way for warlords to seize territory and build networks of influence within and beyond the central 
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government apparatus; they have generally preserved their power intact since 2001. Afghan warlords and 
various mujahideen forces still overlap significantly.  
 
PROBLEMATIC VESTIGES OF COLONIALISM: THE DURAND LINE 
One of the more enduring legacies of the Anglo-Afghan wars and British efforts to ensure the security of 
its colonies in the region is the present border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as the Durand 
Line. This border, drawn by the British in the nineteenth century to separate a weak Afghanistan from 
British India, arbitrarily cuts through the large Pashtun tribal areas. The border is mostly unmarked and 
has remained highly contested by those living in the regions on both sides. Approximately one-third of all 
Pashtuns live within Afghanistan, the remaining two-thirds inside Pakistan.  
 
The continuing lack of any resolution of the Durand Line issue is an important factor fuelling instability and 
insurgent activity in the border regions. There has been no history of serious co-operation between the 
governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to resolve the issue: Afghanistan (and the Soviet Union in its 
day) often threatened to resurrect the “Pashtunistan issue” – an ethnic ambition of some to unite all 
Pashtuns under Afghan leadership – while Pakistan has manipulated the dispute as a bargaining chip in 
its international dealings. Over the longer run, resolution of the Durand Line should be one among many 
important factors that would improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and extend ultimate 
state control over the border areas and tribes. But the Pakistani government is currently unable to control 
huge swathes of Pashtun territory and its tribes in the Northwest Frontier Province, where tribal law reigns 
supreme. Regulation of the tribal territories and their borders, while of great importance, remains an 
exceedingly complex, deep-rooted, long-term project that cannot realistically be adopted as an objective 
in NATO’s shorter-term search for stability in Afghanistan.  
 
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PAKISTAN 
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan, as successor to British imperial power on Afghanistan’s borders, has 
been a continuous variable in Afghan politics and its security. Pakistan views Afghanistan as vital to its 
own geopolitical security, providing a kind of “strategic depth” against the threat of the huge Indian state 
on the other side of Pakistan’s borders. Islamabad’s fundamental strategic vision requires an Afghan 
state that is friendly and responsive to Pakistan’s security needs.  
 
The Pashtun ethnic factor remains key. Pakistan’s large Pashtun population represents Islamabad’s 
primary vehicle of influence inside Afghanistan, an account managed over long years by Pakistani military 
intelligence, the ISI, which lies outside the control of the civilian executive. The ISI and considerable 
numbers of civilian strategists, particularly in the large and powerful Islamist parties, are intent upon 
maintaining influence, and where possible, some degree of control over the Taliban movement to ensure 
it remains friendly to Islamabad. Within Afghanistan itself, the Taliban movement is viewed by large 
numbers of Pashtuns as a vehicle for their own nationalism and political dominance within Afghanistan. 
Destruction of the Taliban movement – were it even possible – at this point basically translates into the 
destruction of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan.  
 
The Pakistani government, despite its rhetoric, is thus highly ambivalent about crushing the Taliban 
insurgency. Furthermore, Taliban supporters are widespread among Pashtuns within Pakistan, where the 
movement is perceived by large numbers as a force for radical, Islamic-based reform inside Pakistan 
itself. In this sense, the movement is a cross-border phenomenon and is thus much bigger than the ISI 
role. 
 
Indeed, the Taliban originally emerged from among Afghan Pashtun refugees who fled to Pakistan during 
the Soviet invasion. Many were poor and lived in refugee camps. Many were also educated there, often in 
madrassas. Radicalized by the anti-Soviet struggle, they received guerrilla training and remain inspired by 
the example of al-Qa’ida’s struggle against their perception of an American bid to dominate the Muslim 
world; they now maintain ties on both sides of the border. Later (and only as the Taliban rose to pre-
eminence), Pakistan was compelled to recognize the importance of the movement to its own interests in 
the region; it thus began to provide training grounds, technical assistance, and later, political support by 
recognizing the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan and helping to finance, with Saudi 
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support, the fledgling government which, while rich in weapons, had little in the way of resources with 
which to meet the basic needs of citizens. 
 
Pakistan’s President Musharraf is thus compelled to engage in a complex juggling act. He must deflect 
American pressure by aggressively co-operating against elements of al-Qa’ida inside Pakistan, but he 
can only apply selective pressure against the Taliban presence there, as the Taliban enjoy much support 
among Pakistani Pashtuns. Musharraf must also acknowledge the many Taliban supporters within his 
own government in the broader context of wide-spread anti-American sentiment among the population at 
large and among influential religious leaders whose support is vital to his political survival. Past efforts to 
extend the writ of the Pakistani Government into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the 
Northwest Frontier Province (among fiercely independent tribesmen who have always enjoyed a local, 
tribally based sovereignty) have generally been disastrous. The area represents the heartland of Islamist 
sentiments and xenophobic passions. Thus the Pakistani government turns a blind eye to some elements 
of the cross-border links and activities of the Taliban whose tribal elements lie on both sides of a national 
“border.”  
 
Afghanistan and Pakistan blame each other for the Taliban resurgence. Pakistan acknowledges that 
some cross-border activity takes place in these largely mountainous regions, but its officials insist that a 
military solution is futile in trying to solve the problem of Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Kabul charges 
that the insurgency is basically fuelled by elements in Pakistan, and that Taliban leader Mullah Omar and 
many other key Taliban leaders take refuge there – a plausible yet deniable charge. Kabul also claims 
that Pakistani madrassas on the border provide a steady supply of suicide bombers, heretofore unheard 
of in Afghan culture. Islamabad retorts that Pakistani intelligence regularly mounts effective counter-
insurgency activities, and that Afghanistan’s Taliban problem is predominantly political, that it is home-
grown and localized to the unruly tribal areas along the border region.  
 
Pakistan’s recent announcement that it would build a security fence in the FATA to prevent the flow of 
Pakistani insurgents into Afghanistan was clearly seized upon as a political opportunity to unilaterally and 
formally delineate the Pakistan-Afghan border along the Durand Line – a boundary that Afghanistan still 
vociferously refuses to recognize. The constant diplomatic sparring between Musharraf and Karzai must 
be understood through this lens of multiple domestic and regional political motivations, often wrapped in 
the language of international security and anti-terrorism. 
 
There would seem to be little doubt that better border controls – extremely difficult under the best of 
circumstances – would help stabilize the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan, but the insurgency has deep 
roots within Afghanistan itself, and the cross-border connections are strong and enduring.  
 
 
III   THE CURRENT SITUATION 
 
Canada thus faces an Afghan population that is deeply wary of foreigners on its soil. After decades of 
bloodshed, Afghans currently in the south have suffered mounting civilian casualties since 2001 as a 
result of misdirected fire from American-led coalition forces. This is coupled with a severely flawed policy 
towards poppy production carried out by the British, the Americans, and the Afghan government seeking 
to eradicate what is frequently the population’s principal livelihood and their sole source of desperately 
needed income. While the Taliban and warlords benefit from the poppy industry, these policies of forcible 
crop destruction only play into the hands of the Taliban.  
 
Reconstruction has been very slow in the south. The food aid distribution system has failed, causing a 
severe famine. Much of the population of southern Afghanistan is alienated from ISAF. Unless these 
circumstances change, the Canadian mission in Kandahar will become less and less acceptable to the 






THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN AFGHANISTAN: SOURCES OF INSECURITY 
The Taliban 
As the central government struggles to consolidate its power and exert influence in the Afghan 
countryside, a variety of illegal, armed spoiler groups continues to disrupt the nation-building process. 
Some of these spoilers are anti-government insurgents; others are paramilitary groups or criminal gangs. 
Distinguishing between these different security threats is essential to the development of an effective, 
long-term security strategy for Afghanistan. 
 
While much of the original Taliban leadership is still extant, the current Taliban insurgency is distinct from 
the original movement in many important socio-political and military respects. When the Taliban first took 
power in Afghanistan in 1995, their leadership was motivated primarily by a conservative interpretation of 
Shariah law, based on the Hanafi school of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. Hanafi jurisprudence is the 
predominant form of religious interpretation in Muslim south and central Asia, and is inherently neither 
extremist nor radical. The Taliban’s particular culturally-driven interpretation of religious law that they 
imposed across the country was, however, specific to the rural south where Pashtunwali – a pre-Islamic 
Pashtun tribal code of conduct and law – and Shariah blend together in an indistinguishable code of 
behaviour and sometimes rough rural justice. Though the Taliban did not impose the “law of the Pashtun” 
on the whole of Afghanistan, their interpretation of Islamic law was coloured by their culturally specific 
understanding of that law. As the Taliban leadership draws from a predominantly rural base, their 
application of Shariah manifested a notable rural character. An obvious example of this is the 
enforcement of the purdah (seclusion of women); while this system of gender segregation is a long-time 
norm (which is not to say it is acceptable) in the villages of Kandahar, enforcing the purdah system in 
urban centres resulted in brutal gender apartheid.  
 
Though born of the Pakistani madrassa system (thus warranting the name “Taliban” or “student”), the 
original movement was overwhelmingly comprised of rural Pashtuns; Mullah Omar extolled and upheld 
social values perceived as common to local people, thus garnering grassroots support for his movement. 
Moreover, because the Taliban had managed to provide the much needed public good of peace in the 
mid-1990s, citizens were at first inclined to support the movement’s rise to power. What began as a 
localized puritanical movement quickly absorbed the support base of rival militia factions as fighters 
joined sides with the newest guerrilla on the scene. Not only did the Taliban have the support of Pakistani 
and Saudi funding, but the leadership also upheld a powerful ideological mandate that had sufficient 
grassroots appeal in the Pashtun rural areas to drain fighters away from enemy factions, such as Hizb-i-
Islami. The Taliban’s greatest public relations success was putting an abrupt end to the chaos and misery 
of the stalemated civil war period, arguably Afghanistan’s worst period in its bloody history, with the 
promise of a puritanical peace. 
 
Nonetheless, upon consolidating their authority over the countryside, the Taliban imposed an ultra-
conservative interpretation and application of the Shariah without the nuance or care found in traditional 
applications of the law, including those in the Pashtun-dominated south and east. As a movement, the 
Taliban enjoyed considerable popularity; as a government, the Taliban had much less grassroots 
success. Under the Taliban regime, Afghanistan was diplomatically and politically isolated from the 
international community, save for Pakistani and Saudi relations. Severe drought and the cut-off of 
international development assistance during the Taliban’s reign exacerbated the existing humanitarian 
crisis. 
 
Since their removal from power in 2001, the Taliban have regressed from a government back into a 
movement. The neo-Taliban are much less a cohesive hierarchy than the original movement was, and 
they currently function as a fluid coalition of semi-autonomous insurgent groups. Although the Taliban 
remain loyal to the leadership of Mullah Omar, they have a considerable degree of military freedom in the 
current insurgency. For example, prominent commander and Taliban hardliner Mullah Dadullah, head of 
Taliban military operations in both Kandahar and Helmand provinces, has a free hand in military decision-
making in the anti-NATO campaign. Different pockets of Taliban resistance have exhibited contradictory 
behaviours, some promising a kinder, gentler Taliban that will allow greater social freedoms, while others 
continue to blow up schools. Such contradictory manifestations demonstrate that the movement has 
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dissolved into a traditional Afghan, guerrilla-style warfare, wherein a lack of a strong central command 
structure makes it difficult for NATO to identify combatants and groups. 
 
Currently, the Taliban have the strongest local support in rural southern Afghanistan, where ethnic 
allegiances and ideological compatibility are most potent. Rural Pashtuns have a deep-seated 
xenophobia and an innate hostility towards foreign occupation. Reaction to the presence of armed forces 
has prompted a reflexive and violent resistance in the isolated rural south, especially as NATO troops 
conduct invasive anti-Taliban actions in the villages. The active combat mission, designed to seek out 
and destroy both dormant and operational Taliban forces, has resulted in large civilian casualties in the 
southern villages in areas such as the Panjwaii and Musa Qala districts. Because of the loss of civilian 
life, these actions have, on the whole, fostered increased support for anti-NATO and anti-government 
insurgency, including support for the Taliban. In this context most rural Pashtuns, regrettably, do not 
particularly distinguish between Canadian, British, American, or Soviet forces.  
 
The nature of the anti-NATO insurgency has further evolved as local Pashtun tribes were antagonized. 
Not only are Taliban out to kill Canadian troops, but victimized Kandahari tribes will also seek revenge for 
the death of their family members. Mullah Dadullah precisely expressed this vicious circle with his 
statement that “for every Talib you kill, I can recruit twenty more.”  
 
Suicide bombing is a new military tactic wholly foreign to Afghans; such a tactic would not have been 
considered socially or culturally acceptable in Pashtun culture. This shift demonstrates an important 
indicator of the ideological sway held by al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and by the Taliban leadership. Though 
the Taliban stem from the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam and are therefore intrinsically opposed to 
Wahhabist doctrine, the increase in suicide bombing attacks indicate that, in the battle for “hearts and 
minds,” the al-Qa’ida message has been propagated more effectively than alternate views. 
 
Non-Taliban Spoiler Groups 
Although the Taliban insurgency is a key factor in understanding insecurity in the south, there are also a 
number of non-Taliban actors undermining the central government’s capacity. For example, Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami group, which in the past never enjoyed alliance with, or even acceptance by, 
the Taliban during their reign, has declared its support for al-Qa’ida and the anti-NATO insurgency. 
 
Perhaps the most important of non-Taliban spoiler groups are the former Tajik-dominated Northern 
Alliance warlords (many of whom are now members of the current government) who retain private militias 
and dominate the countryside in private fiefdoms. These high-level commanders enjoy a much clearer 
chain of authority with their militias than the Taliban insurgency does, and they exercise a considerable 
degree of influence on their respective turfs. Mid-level and local commanders under the authority of these 
warlords have been accused of abusing and exploiting local populations. United States Army officials 
have admitted that some intelligence on Taliban whereabouts from warlord allies has been faulty, and has 
even been exploited to spark American aerial bombardment against rival factions rather than as a 
counter-insurgency measure. 
 
The power of warlord-run parastatal and non-state militias has implications for all aspects of Afghan 
security, particularly as spoiler groups have infiltrated the nation-building process. Efforts have been 
made in security sector reform (SSR) to undermine this warlord power, particularly through the creation of 
the weak, but at least nationally-recruited Afghan National Army (ANA). The locally recruited and poorly 
trained Afghan National Police (ANP), however, has been accused of extreme corruption and co-option 
by local strongmen, essentially giving the ANP a reputation of being local thugs now dressed in new 
uniforms that give them political legitimacy.  
 
The Afghan Security Forces (ASF) are also considered part of the national security architecture; the ASF, 
however, falls under American command, is financed through the American payroll, and functions as the 
Afghan contingent to American-led counter-insurgency operations. While U.S. and NATO forces have 
stated that they benefit from the knowledge of the terrain and guerrilla warfare that the ASF contributes, 
these soldiers are also local recruits with paramilitary associations and bloody militia histories. As such, 
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the ANP, auxiliary police, and ASF often only complicate or worsen the already complex security situation 
in the countryside. 
 
The degree to which these official security forces moonlight as criminal gangsters is the subject of much 
debate in the security reform field. Criminality has surged since the fall of the Taliban, resulting from a 
combination of militia impunity and economic desperation. Forms of reported criminal violence include 
militia rape, murder, kidnapping, bride-napping, human organ trafficking, human trafficking, opium 
production, extortion, arms trafficking, and racketeering. One must therefore take into consideration the 
role of criminal gangs and profit-maximizing militia groups, rather than incorrectly assuming that human 
rights violations are solely related to the insurgency. “Law-and-order”-oriented Taliban also profit in the 
public eye from this lawlessness. 
 
Understanding the extent of the damage these diverse spoiler groups do to the nation-building process is 
difficult. In southern Afghanistan, the most important security consideration remains the capacity of the 
Taliban to spur an ethnically and ideologically driven resistance against perceived NATO imperialism. 
Association with despised predatory local powerbrokers can further de-legitimate NATO forces. Though 
many internally displaced persons (IDPs) and affected villagers have remained neutral in their affiliations, 
neutrality is often not long an option; the balance of allegiances can be tipped rapidly in the Afghan 
environment, especially when NATO forces are perceived as being, ultimately, a transient presence.  
 
 
IV   MANAGING THE AFGHAN SOUTH 
 
INSECURITY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH 
 
The average Kosovar got 25 times more assistance after 11 weeks of air war than Afghanistan 
got after 20 years. And in terms of peacekeeping, Kosovo got 50 times more on a per capita 
basis than Afghanistan.1 
 
In Afghanistan, security and development are integrally linked; it is futile to proceed with one without the 
other. It has been argued that Canada’s current civilian development policies are not achieving the 
necessary success, because they are compromised through close association with the military presence. 
At the same time, the limited nature of reconstruction and economic opportunities in the south likewise 
impacts negatively on the Canadian military presence, putting Canadian soldiers at further risk and 
jeopardizing success.  
 
As was noted in our summary segment, the alleviation of poverty is a critical component  of securing 
stability in Afghanistan, an issue problematized by the relative dearth of sufficient contributions from 
donor communities. The south in particular has had even less access to development assistance than 
other parts of the country, even as it faces a hunger crisis, drought, the destruction of livelihoods through 
poppy crop eradication, aerial bombardment, and a growing insurgency. The devastating famine 
occurring at present in southern Afghanistan is the result of a dysfunctional aid delivery system marred by 
an inability to distribute food aid proportionally among the population or even to monitor its reach to 
southern Afghanistan’s most vulnerable population. Furthermore, southern Afghanistan has the lowest 
number of hospitals of any area, despite the violence there that increases the need to treat the growing 
number of victims of the conflict. The health sector in Kandahar is insufficiently funded, as well. And 
finally, the south has the lowest number of girls in school and maintains only one severely under-
resourced university.  
 
RATING CANADA’S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE SOUTH TO DATE 
With Canada’s major military commitment in Kandahar, one would expect to see a comparable level of 
humanitarian assistance, and where possible, development assistance. The CIDA expects to spend up to 
$20 million this fiscal year in Kandahar (of the planned $100 million aid disbursement across the country) 
                                                 
1 James Dobbins (23 Sept. 2003). Dobbins was the first U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan after the defeat of the 
Taliban and is a leading expert on post-conflict peacebuilding. 
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to be delivered primarily through the PRT. It will disburse even more next year in coordination with the 
relevant local Afghan ministries. Canada also contributes to the Afghan National Programs that benefit 
Kandahar Province as well as the rest of the nation.  
 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) is spending approximately $10–14 million in 
Kandahar this fiscal year through the PRT. The Department of National Defence (DND) also contributes 
through the Commander’s Contingency Fund on numerous smaller initiatives. The critical question is 
whether this is enough to reverse the situation in Kandahar. 
 
The British, whose military contribution to ISAF operates in the southern province of Helmand, recognized 
the need for a greater level of development assistance as a strategy to address insecurity in that Taliban-
ridden province. The Department for International Development (DFID), the United Kingdom’s 
international development agency, in the summer of 2006 created a new $55 million programme to be 
managed by the Afghan government to alleviate poverty through access to credit, assistance to farmers, 
road- and bridge-building schemes (providing employment and increasing access to markets), and 
improving access to clean water and sanitation. 
 
The distribution of food aid is rarely monitored beyond Kandahar City; this makes food supplies and 
distribution networks in the province vulnerable to abuse and corruption and intensifies the political power 
of corrupt individuals and institutions based on their control over essential resources. The problem of 
corruption in Afghanistan has begun to receive acknowledgement by donors and is consistently flagged 
by Afghan civil society organizations as a major concern. But little has been done to address the causes 
of corruption at all levels of government – such as the insufficient salaries of civil servants and police – 
and in the aid industry, or to put in place monitoring and accountability systems to punish those 
perpetuating corrupt practices. 
 
Development goals are also hindered by the understandable reluctance of international and local NGOs 
to operate in the region owing to endemic insecurity. Humanitarian workers have been threatened, 
attacked, and killed in the southern provinces; project sites are vulnerable to sabotage and attack by 
insurgents, and they receive little direct protection from the ISAF troops operating there, as they have 
other priorities. Numerous Afghan organizations (such as the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan 
Refugees [DACAAR]) have halted all operations in the south, as have large international agencies like 
Oxfam. In the south, one in four children will die before the age of five, 70 percent of children are 
malnourished, and 2.5 million people are in urgent need of more food assistance, as estimated by the 
World Food Programme (WFP).  
 
MILITARY OPERATIONS 
The Canadian Forces were embroiled in an intense series of military engagements as soon as they were 
sent to Kandahar. They have operated with bravery. The parallel Dutch deployment in the neighbouring 
region of Uruzgan proceeded much more smoothly. Their slower, less intrusive approach seems to have 
resulted in far fewer casualties among soldiers and civilians, as well as a better “blending” with the local 
conditions. But Uruzgan does not pose as great a security challenge. There are those who believe the 
Dutch, through local tribal elders, essentially struck a bargain with the Taliban to stay out of each other’s 
way. The Taliban are also known to have singled out Kandahar as a priority.  
 
NATO has acknowledged that its single most important mistake in 2006 was the unacceptable numbers 
of innocent bystanders who lost their lives during military operations. This was, of course, not intentional; 
preventing a similar situation would not be an easy task, and would entail some risk. Yet if the local 
population becomes alienated from those troops trying to help them, the results will be irreversible. 
 
There are thus significant differences in the use of military force by NATO countries in Afghanistan. In the 
south, in particular, a choice must be made between either negotiating with the insurgents or confronting 
them. The Dutch approach in Uruzgan deployed more progressively, consulted the local leaders before 
showing up in force in their sectors, and generally avoided any direct confrontation with the insurgents. 
Discussions and local truces negotiated with local elders (such as the British experimental one in Musa 
Qala in Helmand which recently collapsed) can significantly reduce unnecessary destruction and loss of 
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life. If conducted in bad faith, however, they can also provide the insurgents with havens from which to 
regroup.  
 
There are also considerable differences from one PRT to the next, depending on the policy of the country 
in charge. While in the Canadian PRT in Kandahar, the military can in principle be directly involved in 
reconstruction and development work; in the north, in Kunduz, the German PRT strictly forbids it. By their 
presence and coordination efforts, PRTs have certainly brought aid and reconstruction into regions that 
were neglected. They also signal that a simplistic Manichean military approach has been abandoned for a 
much more comprehensive understanding of the conditions that will facilitate a durable solution to the 
violence in Afghanistan and beyond. Mixing humanitarian with military efforts is a delicate matter 
considering the neutrality professed by most humanitarian organizations following decades of experience 
in conflict situations. That said, there must at least be immediate assistance available to villages from 
which the military have operated and caused damage. Money must be immediately put into the hands of 
villagers to rebuild. 
 
The size of the foreign military presence in Afghanistan has been well below what might have been 
expected from the start. In the southern sector, there are approximately 6 soldiers per 100 square 
kilometres. In Bosnia, a country less than a third the size of Afghanistan, there are still 11 soldiers to 
cover the same area more than 10 years after they were first deployed following the Dayton accords (at 
which time there were 117 soldiers per 100 square kilometres). In Haiti, the MINUSTAH can count on 24 
soldiers for every 100 square kilometres. If an insurgent is faced with overwhelming force, he is less likely 
to engage in violent actions. The level of violence in the south in 2006 is a reflection of how little force 
ISAF can muster on the ground. More importantly, the numbers show just how little political will – as 
distinct from rhetoric – countries have when it comes to Afghanistan. While well-conceived tactics are 
important, political will is essential to defeat an insurgency. 
 
 
V   STATE BUILDING: AFGHANISTAN IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
The extremely difficult and typically protracted task of state building lies at the heart of the challenge in 
Afghanistan, entailing the construction or reconstruction of sustainable institutions of governance capable 
of providing citizens with physical and economic security and with a genuine voice in political decision 
making. While some progress in this direction has been made following the fall of the Taliban, the much 
larger and more challenging process of regime consolidation, economic change, and entrenchment of 
home-grown Afghan pluralist dynamics is still far from accomplished; it may not even be achievable in any 
realistic time frame. Generalizing from the record of state-building efforts in other recent post-conflict 
settings, the international community should not contemplate the withdrawal of ISAF forces or of foreign 
NGOs until after a consolidated foundation has been laid for self-sustaining state institutions. Indeed, 
what is required is greater commitment. Long-term commitment and ongoing investment are both 
needed. Expectations by members of the international community of rapid results in return for efforts and 
resources expended in short-term state-building are likely to be highly unrealistic, and can even be 
counter-productive to the overall goals of an intervention mission.  
 
Moreover, successful state-building and regime legitimization are inextricably linked to other critical issues 
such as the defeat or de-radicalization of extremist forces, constriction of the present narco-economy over 
the longer term, and the establishment of a rule-bound framework of state institutions untainted by 
widespread administrative corruption or local level “state capture” by criminal and radical elements.  
 
THE POST-BONN GOVERNANCE CONTEXT 
Implementation of the goals outlined in the Bonn Conference process regarding governance, 
reconciliation, and assistance in Afghanistan has proved to be extremely slow and rather unsuccessful in 
some areas, weakening the government’s overall credibility. Key problems include a lack of capacity in 
the public administration and judicial sectors, and the inability of the government to achieve broad 
representation of ethnic and social groups critical to the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. 
These difficulties were aggravated by the behaviour of entrenched regional and factional leaders, some of 
whom maintain their own territorial fiefdoms and amass wealth through corrupt practices, including the 
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drug trade. They were compounded by the slow pace of economic construction, linked in turn to 
insufficient international funding and mounting security problems. In this environment, the ousted forces 
of the Taliban regime – who never accepted defeat and were not co-opted into the Bonn process – 
gradually began regrouping, playing on the government’s weaknesses and shortcomings, reviving old 
alliances, and establishing new allies, all this even as they were mobilizing resources and recruits within 
and outside the country.  
The early disregard by the new Afghan government of the defeated Taliban – admittedly under difficult 
conditions for a new regime with its highly limited sovereignty – prevented the creation of a 
comprehensive amnesty program for selective reintegration of members of the losing side into the new 
society. And once Afghanistan had an operational, post-Bonn political system, including an elected 
legislature, it became more difficult politically to approach or co-opt members of armed groups such as 
the Taliban, who were now viewed as already outside the “legitimate political process.”  
  
Under these circumstances, a vicious cycle gradually arose in many areas of the country: problems of 
insecurity obstructed reconstruction; blocked reconstruction fostered insecurity; and security and 
reconstruction difficulties prevented sufficient progress in the area of governance reform for the promotion 
of public order and significant economic progress. By the fall of 2006, such interdependent difficulties 
resulted in a highly deteriorated situation, especially in Afghanistan’s Pashtun-dominated regions of the 
east and south; a continuing trend which presently is a source of urgent concern for Canada and the 
international community.  
 
THE SECURITY-GOVERNANCE-RECONSTRUCTION NEXUS 
Military security lies at the heart of any substantial progress in governance and economic development. 
Robust Canadian and international military action is essential to halt suicide attacks, roadside bombings, 
and the abduction of people working for government and private organizations. Assisting the Afghan army 
to achieve its objectives and being publicly perceived as a viable defence force is closely linked to the 
regime’s own legitimacy. Recent tactics by the Canadian military such as embedding small teams of 
soldiers in Afghan units have been helpful, and efforts to retrain the Afghan army (currently under way 
with the assistance of a Canadian detachment) are early positive steps. But only when people in local 
communities recognize that they are truly safe from violent retribution when they assist the ANA and 
public authorities can more progress be made.  
Clearly military means cannot impose the organic processes of state-building, accountability of 
government, or pluralism. But a framework of security is a necessary precondition for citizen participation 
in the polity and economy and for the operation of an educational system to help nurture such practices. 
 
RULE-OF-LAW AND RECONCILIATION  
Traditional Afghan methods of adjudication by local and tribal institutions (jirga/shura-based, informal 
justice) are still widely and generally productively utilized for addressing the bulk of legal disputes in the 
country, including non-political murders, small claims, criminal matters, and so on. But such traditional 
methods of justice – and sometimes injustice – need to be supplemented by a viable, country-wide, 
formal state court system presided over by qualified judges (at present, 50 percent of the approximately 
1500 judges have no higher education) and “sensitized” to international legal norms and basic principles 
of human rights. Moreover, in the current context of low salaries, corruption in the justice system is rife. 
Courts are also backlogged, and record keeping is extremely poor. As one Afghan judge recently pointed 
out, “In the whole country, we may not even have two qualified defence lawyers … This kind of justice 
system, which is not clear and transparent, threatens the government and democracy.”   
President Karzai has promised his foreign donors that he will rebuild the country’s justice system by 2010 
(ironically, the same year that the Taliban recently identified as their target for seizing control of the entire 
country), but the Italian-led effort to establish legal reform has been very slow. If NATO and the 
international community are serious about their commitment to Afghanistan’s state-building process – and 
want ordinary Afghan citizens to develop trust in a formal justice system – expanded assistance for legal 
development is a seminal area.  
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The December 2006 launch of the “Action Plan of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for Peace, Justice, 
Reconciliation” may also be a step forward in transitional justice development. But it will take time and 
substantial foreign funding to implement. And, as a recent Human Rights Watch report indicates, “several 
highly placed members of the current Afghan government and legislature were implicated during the 
brutal fighting that killed or displaced several hundred Kabul residents over the early 1990s and 
precipitated the rise of the Taliban.” 
 
FOSTERING POLITICAL INCLUSION: “TALKING TO THE TALIBAN” 
Following the creation of secure local conditions, equally essential is the de-radicalization of forces that 
are presently hostile to the regime, and when possible, their incorporation into the political process. 
Achieving this goal will require far more than episodic, jirga-centred dialogue between the government 
and extremist anti-state elements, the tokenistic representation of former radical figures in official state 
agencies, or the negotiation of ad hoc, local, cease-fire agreements with militant forces. What is needed 
is a process of substantial conversion or reorientation of anti-state elements into an open and non-violent 
political dynamic.  
 
NATO countries do not seemingly now have the resolve to invest the huge new financial, human, and 
logistical resources – and long years – required to vanquish the Taliban on the battlefield. If NATO states 
it will only be satisfied with a decisive military victory, the Taliban will call our bluff. The Taliban have 
demonstrated greater resolve, tactical efficiency, and ability to absorb the costs of war over the long term 
than have NATO forces. While the Taliban cannot achieve decisive military victory on the ground, as 
spoilers they are able to continually undermine the capacity of the central government. They are 
convinced that continued fighting will further reduce the resolve of NATO forces and increase the 
potential for Taliban victory. Thus, the current calculus of interests for Taliban decision-makers favours 
continued fighting. Given the costs of war, NATO needs to look candidly at the prospects – aware that 
there can be no guarantees – of a political solution. 
 
Any NATO effort to negotiate successfully with the Taliban involves changing the calculus of interest for 
Taliban decision-makers themselves; for NATO, it can only be judged a success if the Taliban come to 
favour a political settlement, refrain from violence, accept inclusion within the central government (and an 
ability to influence its character), and above all, stop providing a safe haven for al-Qa’ida fighters. This is 
a long shot, and it can only come about if the incentive structure of carrots and sticks is sufficiently 
powerful to influence Taliban decisions. 
 
New deterrents and incentives for the Taliban are most effectively negotiated only via backchannels. 
Musharraf could be directly approached on such an initiative, but conceivably, for reasons of political 
deniability, he might prefer to remain aloof from such bargaining in order to retain the fig leaf of 
deniability. The ISI, as the key covert action arm of Pakistan in Afghanistan, is the ultimate and most 
discreet channel for such negotiations. It would also allow NATO to detail its mission objectives, red lines, 
and irreducible minimum goals to Taliban decision makers that otherwise may not be fully grasped in the 
often paranoid Pakistani fundamentalist context. 
 
Carrots 
Making political participation an attractive incentive for the Taliban requires both an ideological and a 
pragmatic appeal. How powerful that power is permitted to be becomes a key point of negotiations and a 
reflection of the correlation of forces on the ground. 
 
The Taliban could be enticed by an opportunity to come in from the cold, join the government, achieve a 
certain legitimacy, and pursue their own interests from within. They could focus on issues key to them 
such as amnesty for themselves, elimination of warlords and corruption, economic gains, development 
and jobs in the Pashtun regions, resource sharing, the need to include more Islamic values, and a 
circumscribed relationship with the West. But the Taliban does not share a pluralist or democratic vision 
of governance and currently aspires to dominance in the political order – a goal that directly translates 
into greatly enhanced Pashtun power as well. How readily will they be willing to give up on prospects for 




While the Taliban are confident of their ability to force NATO to a stalemate in the Pashtun regions, what 
they may not fully grasp is the ability of NATO to impose the same stalemate on the Talibans’ own 
ambitions through a NATO resolve to stabilize the rest of the country (non-Pashtun areas). More 
importantly, NATO can, with very little cost or effort and through indefinite, sustained financial and 
logistical support to the government and the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, accept a situation of 
protracted civil war that the Taliban cannot win, and that might eventually even lead to long-term failure 
for the movement.  
  
The stakes become vastly raised – even more dramatically for Pakistan and the ISI – if NATO should 
additionally acquiesce to a major role for India in Afghanistan – Islamabad’s ultimate bête noire. This kind 
of scenario greatly enhances the attractiveness of a political deal in Afghanistan, even one involving 
limitations on the Taliban’s ambitions while including them in the political game – an important goal for 
Pakistan.  
 
Nonetheless, proposals to reach out to the “less hardened Taliban” and bring them “in from the cold” 
require clear thinking and concrete steps, including the reaction of people in other parts of the country. 
Differentiating members of an extremist organization according to their different levels of commitment – 
the “ladder of extremism” – is a well-trodden counter-insurgency approach. Afghanistan needs a 
revitalized amnesty program that could permit the political integration of those Taliban who are willing to 
responsibly participate in a peaceful and open political process. But the threshold for such political 
reintegration should not be set so low that it would permit the political participation of those who have not 
demonstrably departed from a past of egregious crimes (or, as some have said, “are beyond 
forgiveness”). Accommodation with extremist Taliban or their temporary incorporation in ad hoc, local 
arrangements, if not carried out properly, could jeopardize the aspirations of Afghanistan’s diverse 
population, as well as the commitment of Canada and other NATO countries to international legal norms, 
the appropriate handling of war crimes, and a commitment to democratic pluralism. But these extremists 
will, in the end, be controlled by Pakistan only if Islamabad believes that pressuring them to make a 
political accommodation meets Pakistan’s own national interests.  
 
 
VI   THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE 
 
The success of NATO in Afghanistan is vital. But given the course of events and current circumstances, 
there is a quite reasonable possibility that NATO may not succeed. The resources – military and 
development and humanitarian assistance – may not be forthcoming. “Failure” of the mission would most 
likely come about if, after one or two more years, participating members witness only increased instability, 
stepped up enemy attacks, heightened NATO casualties, and a floundering central government – a 
trajectory that will spur the withdrawal of most participating member-state forces from Afghanistan. Thus 
NATO must examine the character and implications of such a failure scenario, that is, the prospect of a 
pullout before achieving minimal goals, creating the perception of defeat. This may be “unacceptable” or 
“unthinkable,” but it may yet impose itself, much like the deteriorating situation in Iraq.  
 
Given that, it is important to recognize that even scenarios involving NATO mission failure can produce a 
range of alternative and differing scenarios. Among them are the following: 
 
• Afghanistan Returns to Civil War: The Taliban become dominant in all the Pashtun regions, and 
elements of the old Northern Alliance (non-Pashtun) dominate in the other areas: Kabul once 
again is contested. Pakistan intervenes overtly or covertly to give the Taliban the upper hand 
again over the Northern Alliance. The West arms the Northern Alliance against it or is required to 
take a stand in Kabul.  
 
• The Taliban Fracture in Internal Struggles: The Taliban take over most of the Pashtun areas 
virtually uncontested. But fissures among the Taliban develop; not all Pashtuns by any means 
support the Taliban’s narrow and primitive instincts (the bloody-mindedness of many of them), 
even as they perceive them as the primary vehicle of Pashtun nationalism today. The Pashtun 
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region loses out on western development aid with the departure of NATO; many of the Taliban 
now resent the presence of foreign jihadis who have little to offer them in the absence of a hated 
foreign presence. Fault lines emerge: 
o “Moderate” vs. radical Taliban; 
o Domestically oriented vs. internationally oriented Taliban; 
o Splits over the price of relationships with foreign jihadis and the implications for Taliban 
maintenance of power in Kabul; 
o Divisions among east vs. west Pashtun tribal orientations (and many other smaller 
clan/tribal differences); 
o Divisions on how beholden the Pashtuns wish to be to the interests of Islamabad and 
Pakistani Pashtun influence. 
 
• Jihadi Pashtuns Triumph: The Taliban take over, and moderates are quickly marginalized by a 
triumphalist spirit among the Taliban that they have now vanquished the last remaining global 
superpower – after their earlier victory over the USSR. Al-Qa’ida inspires the Taliban with an 
internationalist jihadi vision that lends support to foreign Islamist elements; many Afghans are 
now drawn into the international mission to discharge their debt in jihad to other Muslims who 
aided them in their hour of need against Russians and Americans. The Pashtun become a new 
factor in the international jihad, even without al-Qa'ida bases as such in Afghanistan. 
 
• Afghanistan is Divided into International Spheres of Influence: After a Taliban takeover, Pakistan 
recognizes that it cannot afford to run through a reprise of the Bin Laden adventure of 2001. 
Islamabad moves to assert considerable control over the Pashtun regions through tribal and 
financial instruments; they cannot exert full control, but they can deter the most radical elements 
with the assistance of non-jihadi fundamentalists in the key Pakistani Islamist parties. Afghanistan 
becomes divided into significant spheres of influence: Pakistan dominant in the east and south; 
Iran in the west and in central Hazarajat; Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the north.  
 
• A Resurgent “Pashtunistan”: The Taliban successfully extends their ideological power into the 
northwest frontier of Pakistan, further weakening Islamabad’s hold there. A transnational Pashtun 
force emerges that operates independently in many respects, weakening any centralized control 
over the Pashtun regions and opening the door to jihadi enclaves. Pakistan is seriously 
threatened with losing the NWF and Baluchistan areas to a united Pashtunistan movement. A 
Pak-Afghan war emerges over the Pashtunistan issue.  
 
• Pakistan Dominates Kabul: The Pashtuns are emboldened after their victory over NATO and now 
seek to play the Pashtunistan card once again – calls for Pashtun unity that deeply threaten 
Pakistan’s integrity, as they have in the past. Islamabad moves to confront and stem this action 
by asserting increased de facto dominance over the Pashtun of eastern and southern 
Afghanistan. Pakistan also works to ensure that the Pashtun take over Kabul once again, since 
the Northern Alliance is dangerously anti-Pakistani, pro-Indian, and outside of Islamabad’s 
control. Pakistan, working with western financial inducements, is able to deter the internationalist 
jihadi elements among the Pashtuns. 
 
• Afghanistan Disappears: It is unlikely, but not inconceivable, that Afghanistan could even 
disappear and be absorbed by the respective border states in accordance with its ethnic makeup. 
The basic division would be as follows: north of the Hindu Kush – classically central Asian in its 
culture – reverts to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan; south of the Hindu Kush, the 
Pashtuns go with Pakistan; and accompanied by a huge demographic impact on that country, 
western Afghanistan goes with Iran. 
 
AID SCENARIOS – VARIATIONS 
 
• NATO is finished as a force in Afghanistan – perceived as a tool of the U.S. military hegemony in 
Afghan minds – but with its military departure, there remains continued desire for western aid 
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money and expertise in many Pashtun regions. Pashtun/Taliban are not opposed to such aid 
since it involves no military instruments. Many Pashtuns and even moderate Taliban are willing to 
protect aid workers from xenophobic zealots.  
 
• The outside world is compelled to deliver aid to the Pashtun regions via Pakistan, a reprise on the 
mechanism utilized by the jihad against the USSR. This is not an ideal arrangement, but Pakistan 
helps keep the lid on – that is, it largely controls international jihadi activity, even while highly 
xenophobic, anti-western, but non-jihadi Islamists forces gain the upper hand in the region and 
set the mood of Pakistan. It will be a form of “anti-western lite,” possibly the best the West can 
get.  
 
• The West simply has too much baggage; it outsources the development work in Afghanistan to 
Japan, China, Russia, India, and other countries perceived as having less imperialist baggage. All 




• The failure of NATO in Afghanistan is a disaster for the hopes of an Atlanticist, out-of-region 
project. But some states of Europe find NATO heavily compromised in any case as the key 
instrument of American power in Europe and become totally alienated by its experience with 
Washington under Bush’s leadership. The EU becomes willing to try new instruments of its own, 
especially in the now hyper-sensitive and anti-American Muslim world. The EU is able to function 
more successfully free of the U.S. “taint.” 
 
• Alternatively, other international forces noted above and including Japan, South Korea, China, 
India, Russia, Turkey, and even Iran in some respects, contribute to new, looser, ad hoc project-
packaging in Eurasia. This represents a definitive tipping away from a Washington-centric, or 
even Eurocentric, vision of the international order.  
 
These represent a few variations on possible outcomes; there are many others that can be crafted by 
combining various elements touched upon here. They should be thought about in combination with a 
significant U.S. defeat in Iraq, with all that portends for the region. 
 
 
VIII   POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
 
• The battle for Afghanistan must be long term, requiring a sustained Canadian commitment in 
development assistance for a minimum of ten years. The planned overall budgetary increases 
for CIDA must be implemented. There is no other way to overcome such deeply ingrained 
problems in any shorter time span. Either Canada will need to make increased commitments or 
persuade other countries to do so. Canada “wears” Kandahar, and the fight to turn loyalties in a 
NATO-positive direction must clearly be the priority. 
 
• Despite some inherent contradictions between the use of military force and the need to build 
independent civilian structures and institutions, in order to protect civilian lives a robust military 
presence will be required beyond 2009 to protect the civilian infrastructure until the security 
situation is under much greater control. This involves an increase in the overall NATO military 
presence and military expenditure; NATO must have an integrated strategy for all member 
participants that excludes selective and constraining “national caveats” on what national forces 
can and cannot do. 
• Responsibility for the security of Afghanistan must be turned over to the Afghans; much more 
rapid progress must be made to increase both the size and the quality of the Afghan National 
Army and the police force. 
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• Excessive reliance on aerial bombing must be replaced by more “boots on the ground” 
designed to keep the military more in touch with the ground situation. Every effort must be made 
to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. 
• The food delivery system in the south requires urgent attention to overcome current 
malnutrition and starvation. The Canadian government should allocate a substantially increased 
amount of funding towards food aid specifically in that region. Effective food aid requires an 
airtight distribution system which reaches the most vulnerable villages rapidly and in co-operation 
with organizations having an excellent track record for aid delivery there, such as the International 
Committee for the Red Cross. 
 
• Improved security on project sites for safe project implementation is urgently required, and 
CIDA should work with its partners to ensure the necessary funding. Specifically needed, for 
example, are bullet-proof glass, additional security staff, consultation with security experts, more 
secure premises, safe transportation through insecure areas for beneficiaries who must reach the 
project site, and mobile project delivery to reach communities in high-risk areas.  
 
• CIDA should organize forums which allow for the exchange of information on project security 
among CIDA partners; this includes shared security manuals and common procedures on office 
security in high-risk areas. 
 
• Strengthening the capacity of public sector institutions, including central, provincial, and 
local agencies, remains critical to the next stage of the international mission in Afghanistan. This 
endeavour must also overcome the disconnect, recently noted by the UN, between “parallel 
administrations” run respectively by the international community and by the Afghan government.  
 
• Innovative alternatives are urgently required to replace current counterproductive policies of 
poppy eradication by force that only alienate farmers and drive them into the arms of the 
Taliban. Poppy production in Afghanistan has been a problem for over half a century and has 
consistently defied international control efforts. Meanwhile, the world’s hospitals face a major 
shortage of opiate-based medicines like morphine. Canada should advocate for the creation of an 
international marketing board for Afghan poppy producers, whereby farmers are paid fair prices, 
and overseen by the auspices of a governmental body that would ensure central regulation, 
legality, and security. Production marketed through this body would be used solely for medicinal 
purposes on the international market. 
 
• More funds should be allocated towards immediate and visible improvement of health services 
in Kandahar and the south for the local population, including doctor upgrade training.  
 
• A viable, efficient, honest, country-wide formal state court system, presided over by qualified 
judges and “sensitized” to international legal norms and basic principles of human rights, is a 
critical facet of  Afghanistan’s future stability; Canada and the international community are well 
qualified to provide assistance with this, working within the framework offered by the Action Plan 
on Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation.  
 
• Canada should support, with technical assistance and financial contributions, the implementation 
of the action plan for transitional justice outlined in the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission’s “A Call for Justice.” 
 
• Aid distribution in the south requires immediate improved monitoring to assess needs, identify 
gaps in the provision of aid, and redirect the flow of aid to ensure better distribution balance to the 
most vulnerable. The Canadian International Development Agency should co-operate with an 
established central coordinating body, such as the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief 
(ACBAR) and with relevant Afghan government ministries.  
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• Canada should provide technical assistance to Kandahar’s sole university, particularly for the 
repair and construction of infrastructure, expansion of students served (including accessibility to 
female students), improved teacher training, curriculum reform, and the acquisition of library 
resources. The university’s medical school is the highest priority. Greater effort is required to 
recruit female and low-income students from rural areas.  
 
• All CIDA-funded projects should be required to include budget provisions that will contribute 
to preventing corruption, such as higher salaries for civil servants, police, and other 
government staff known to partake in corrupt practices.  
 
• Canada needs to work with international partners to ensure that the National Solidarity Program 
(NSP) shifts a larger share of the implementation from international organizations over to Afghan 
organizations and to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.  
 
• Provision must be made for immediate assistance to villages after military operations have 
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